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DRUG DEALING AND STREET GANGS-
THE NEW NUISANCES: MODERNIZING OLD
THEORIES AND BRINGING NEIGHBORS
TOGETHER IN THE WAR AGAINST CRIME
I. INTRODUCTION
A child learns his numbers by counting the gunshots that echo in his
neighborhood.' The sound of breaking glass keeps one woman awake
at night;2 another is afraid to walk down her street to buy a loaf of bread
during the day.3 A girl playing on her front lawn is continuously
harassed by drug dealers and drug customers.4 A teenager is held up at
1. Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). See infra
notes 76-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Lew case).
2. Janet Wells, Berkeley Neighbors Oust Criminals, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 1993, at
A 19.
3. Maitland Zane, Judgment Against Owner of Crime-Ridden Building, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 21, 1995, at AI8 (quoting plaintiff in recent small claims case whose community had
become violent due to neighboring nuisance property). See also Judy Pasternak, Wave Of
Fear: America's Soaring Concern Over Crime, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994, at Al
(reporting on increased community fear as crime rates rise in St. Louis and other cities);
Timothy Williams, Valley Crime Fell Last Year, But Residents'Fears Soared, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1994, at Al ("[F]ears about random and rampant violence were fueled [in 1993]
by a series of cold-blooded and arbitrary killings. ").
4. Jackie Boor, Forum: When the Neighbors Fight Back, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 9,
1994, at FI (describing the experiences of residents in a formerly safe Sacramento
neighborhood). For a discussion of the relationship between gang-related activity and
community violence, see Roger Chesley, Block By Block: Gangs Pervade Communi-
ty-Violence Plagues Southwest Detroit, DErROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 1, 1994, at 1B
(reporting increased violence due to drug trade and gang activity in Southwest Detroit).
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gun point while walking to the bus stop.' A man spends $2,000 to put
up a six-foot concrete wall to prevent bullets from flying through the
walls of his house.6 Another man walks down his driveway to pick up
the newspaper in the morning, only to find that the body of yet another
drug overdose victim has been dumped onto his sidewalk.'
Street crime statistics in American cities continue to rise.' The
number of our nation's youths involved in street gangs and drug dealing
is especially alarming.9 As crime rates increase across the country, the
police are becoming less able to respond appropriately to the needs of all
citizens."0 Many residents in communities that were at one time
But see Ken Ellingwood, County Gang Crime-By The Numbers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1994, at BI (noting a county-wide survey of gang incidents showing gang crime is not
centered on drug-related activity).
5. Daryl Strickland, Oakland Fights Back in Small Claims Court, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 25, 1994, at B2. The fourteen-year-old boy was the son of Molly Wetzel, a single
mother of two. Id. After the incident, Wetzel decided to found the "Safe Streets Now"
program in her neighborhood. Id. The program has since gained national recognition.
Id. See, e.g., Gus diZerega, Closing Down Drug Houses, WITCHITA EAGLE, Sept. 25,
1994, at 16A.
See infla note 15 for a discussion of the progress, success, and expansion of the "Safe
Streets Now" program.
6. See Louis Sahagun, Church to Confront Drug Dealers' Cocaine, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
22, 1991, at 1 (describing the efforts of church leaders and other community residents to
close down neighboring drug houses and fight the increasing violence in their neighbor-
hood).
7. See Oscar v. University Students Co-op. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1020 (1992). See infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text for a full
discussion of this case and its implications.
8. See, e.g., John McCormick & Bill Turque, Big Crimes, Small Cities, NEWSWEEK,
June 10, 1991, at 16 (reporting increase in violent crimes in cities with populations of
500,000 to I million in 1990). Drive-by shootings and other types of random violence are
becoming more prevalent; Judith Gaines, Shots at Houses Hit Neighborhood's Gut,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1990 at 36 (reporting nine drive-by shootings in Manchester,
New Hampshire which have not injured anyone but have increased fear in the neighbor-
hood); Sonsyrea Tate & Michael Cromwell, Drive-by Shooting Wounds Five Pupils,
WASH. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990, at Al (reporting five children injured in a drive-by shooting
on their way home from school).
9. See, e.g., Deborah Barfield, Medium-Size Cities are Also Struggling with Youth
Violence as in the Case of Large Cities, PHIL. INQ., Feb. 12, 1994, at D88 ("Youth
violence-some call it an epidemic-is no longer just a big-city problem.").
10. See diZerega, supra note 5, at 16A (noting the average police department spends
approximately $15,000 and one year to close down a single drug house); Monte R. Young
& Michael Slackman, Cracks in the Laivs: Officials Say They Lack Tools to Shut Drug
Dens for Good, NEWSDAY, May 6, 1990, at 5. Ineffective laws prevent police from
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considered safe are now overcome by fear each time they leave their
doorsteps." Families who once lived peacefully in quiet communities
have become hostages in their own homes, terrified of their own
neighbors. 2 However, many Americans have tired of being victimized
and are no longer willing to wait for criminals to come to them. 3
Increasingly, citizens are joining together to fight crime in their
communities and cities. 4 Residents and tenants alike are beginning to
permanently shutting crack houses. Id. The presence of a crack house reduces the quality
of life for the surrounding neighborhood because a "constant parade of users and dealers
marching in and out of the front door brings with it increased burglaries, robberies,
prostitution, traffic, noise and litter." Id.
11. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Boor, supra note 4, at Fl (recounting the story of a small, peaceful
neighborhood transformed into a haven for criminals when clientele of a neighboring motel
deteriorated); Wells, supra note 2, at A19 (telling a similar story about a neighborhood in
Berkeley).
13. See Pasternak, supra note 3, at Al. Betsy Cantrell, crime prevention director of
the National Sheriffs Association, bluntly stated "We can't expect law enforcement to
protect us all." Id. Denise Bailey, a founder of Neighborhood Watch in St. Louis, stated
that she began the program in 1992 because she wanted her children to be able to play
outside. Id. Convinced "the police couldn't, or wouldn't help," she concluded that the
community would have to do the job, rather than stand idly by and watch crime destroy
the neighborhood. Id.
14. See, e.g., Pasternak, supra note 3. Unfortunately, programs such as Neighborhood
Watch may often increase fear while having little effect on crime. Id. (citing study
finding that Neighborhood Watch had no impact on crime in Chicago neighborhoods).
Without the help of police, members of these programs, accused of "snitching," become
easy targets for criminals. Id. (describing attacks against resident organizers in a St. Louis
neighborhood). For this reason as well as others, Bonnie Bucqueroux, associate director
of the National Center for Community Policing at Michigan State University, noted that
"Neighborhood Watch is kind of passt." Id.
Nevertheless, across the country, community involvement to combat crime is on the rise.
See also Melinda Beck et al., Video Vigilantes, NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1991, at 42, 44
(discussing recent use of video cameras to apprehend criminals or to publicize criminal
activities); Phil Borchmann, Mothers Join Alliance to Stop Crime, CHI. TRIB., May 18,
1994, at 3 (Citizens Alliance organizes projects to fight gangs and drugs); Robert D.
Davila, Neighborhood Association Reveals Secrets of lts Success, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct.
13, 1994, at B3 (local group conducts seminars at McGeorge Law School to educate
residents on fighting nuisances and crime); Jake Doherty, Westlake Crusade for Street
Racks Up Victories, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1994, at 8 (community volunteers organize
meetings for residents and interact with city officials to help fight crime in their area);
Duke Helfand, They're Cleaning Up in Court: Neighbors Sue Landlords to Get Rid of
Drug Dealers and Troublemakers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1994, at 8 (resident leads crusade
to fight nuisance properties in her neighborhood); Deborah Sullivan, Taking Control of the
Streets, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1995, at JlO (residents form quasi-governmental town
councils resulting in a 30% drop in serious crime in the area). A new book offers advice
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take action against their neighbors and landlords to free their neighbor-
hoods of drugs, gangs, and other types of violence. 5
This Note explores various theories under which a property owner
may sue a neighbor when criminal activity is taking place on the
neighbor's premises. The Note strongly supports community involve-
ment, and focuses on what communities in Missouri may do to fight the
owners of properties known to be the sites of illegal drug transactions or
street gang activity.
Part II outlines the common law of nuisance and the possibilities of
suing landowners under a public or private nuisance theory. Part III
discusses the extension of landlord-tenant law to create a duty to protect
tenants from foreseeable violence and crime. Part III also examines the
extension of this duty to the neighbors of an owner's property. Most
plaintiffs who sue neighbors for criminal activity occurring on their
neighbors' property apply either a nuisance or extended-duty theory, or
both.' 6 Part IV discusses an unsuccessful effort to sue the owners of a
to community residents seeking to organize their neighborhoods in an effort to decrease
crime. Focusing on organization and education, the book teaches how to start a
neighborhood crime prevention group, including information on holding neighborhood
meetings, running groups smoothly, and improving home security. STEPHANIE MANN &
M.C. BLAKEMAN, SAFE HOMES, SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS; STOPPING CRIME WHERE YOU
LIVE (Marcia Steward & Ralph Warner eds., 1993).
15. See supra note 14. An especially successful national organization for fighting
crime has been the "Safe Streets Now" (SSN) program, founded in Oakland, California in
1989. The program targets nuisance property, bringing neighbors together to document
all criminal activity, warn the landowners, and if need be, sue the landowners in small
claims court. See diZerega, supra note 5, at 16A (recounting the SSN's history). See also
Rick DelVecchio, Making Oakland Safe: Neighbors Fight Drugs and Win, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 25, 1993, at Al (citing increased property values in SSN birthplace); Rick
DelVecchio, Oakland Gets NovelAnti-Drug Program: Do-t-Yourself Trainingfor Citizens
is the Key, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 19, 1993, at A21 (reporting Wetzel's claim that SSN
eliminated 285 drug outlets since 1989); Bill Hart, Neighbors Turn to Courts to Fight
Crime, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Apr. 17, 1994, at GI (noting Phoenix, Arizona official's
interest in SSN model); John J. Monahan, Citizens Learn Tactics to Fight Drugs, Crime,
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, MA), Mar. 16, 1994, at BI (discussing SSN training
session); C.Q. Petersen, Learning the Ways to Weed Out Crime and Fight Blight, PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (Riverside, CA), Dec. 15, 1994, at BI (discussing SSN training seminar);
Winston W. Wiley, Neighbors Lookfor Trouble, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, MA),
Sept. 18, 1994, at Al (discussing Worcester, MA SSN program). For a complete
discussion of cases in which residents have sued neighbors and landlords for criminal
activity occurring on their property, see infira part III. For a list of newspaper articles
discussing such cases, see infra note 133.
16. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(applying landlord-tenant law to hold owner liable for assault on tenant by intruder); Lew
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nuisance property under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).' 7
Due to problems of proof and statutory interpretation, these theories
have failed to sufficiently deal with the overwhelming drug and gang
problem on Missouri properties.' s  Part V of this Note therefore
proposes two separate statutory amendments. The first supplements a
recent Missouri law that allows landowners to sue their neighbors in
small claims court. The second proposal provides additional remedies
for those suing under Missouri's nuisance laws. Both proposals are
based on the idea that community residents working together within the
legal system are the best resources for combatting local drug and gang
activity. Landowners, particularly absentee landlords, who are aware of
a problem but fail to respond adequately should be held liable for
damages to neighboring landowners. These damages should include
compensation for depreciation of property values, 9 as well as compen-
sation for emotional distress. The suggested amendments will facilitate
the joining together of individuals to fight crime in their communities.
II. HISTORY: COMMON LAW NUISANCE
Nuisances are classified as either private or public, and each
represents a different area of tort liability.2" However, courts apply
some of the same substantive rules of law to both types of nuisances."
v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (applying nuisance theory);
Kelly v. Boys' Club of St. Louis, Inc., 588 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (permitting
claim based on nuisance theory to proceed). See infra part III for a complete discussion
of these cases.
17. See Oscar v. University Students Co-op. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1992)
(discussing requirement of RICO claim). See infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text
for a complete discussion of this case.
18. See, e.g., Snelling v. Land Clearance for ReDev. Auth., 793 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990) (affirming dismissal of nuisance claim). See infra notes 122-30 and
accompanying text for a complete discussion of this case.
19. See infra note 77.
20. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A cmt. b (1977) (noting
the different meanings of "nuisance").
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 40 intro, note. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D
Nuisances § 33 (1989).
The law of nuisance has long been noted for its confusion, and its rules remain
extremely elusive. See generally Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood
Law of Public Nuisance: A Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After
Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REv. 359, 363-82 (1990) (contrasting public and private nuisance
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Neighbors may apply either nuisance theory to stop certain activities
when the use and enjoyment of their own property is adversely
affected.22
Private nuisance is a tort theory which protects the interests of
landowners or those who occupy property.23 It can be defined as a
substantial and unreasonable interference with the quiet use and
enjoyment of real property.24 A private nuisance may arise from the
unreasonable, indecent, or unlawful use by a person of his property
which injures the right of another.25  The use must produce some
material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or hurt so that the law
will presume a consequent damage.26  Because a private nuisance is a
civil wrong based on the disturbance of an individual's rights, the
remedy belongs to the one whose rights have been violated.
law). See also Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871, 873 (N.Y. 1970)
(permitting neighboring landowners of cement factory found to be a polluter to recover
"permanent damages," but denying injunction against factory's operation as being an
attempt to achieve direct public objectives beyond those of the private litigants). The
tendency of courts to misuse the terms "private nuisance" and "public nuisance," and to
substitute such terms for any analysis, have led even Dean Prosser to describe nuisance
law as an "impenetrable jungle." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 616-17 (5th ed. 1984). Some of the confusion arises because,
at one time, someone sued for private nuisance had a defense if he could show that it was
a public nuisance. J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance-A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 55, 59 (1989). Spencer noted that nuisance "is a chameleon word, with a meaning
technical or general, depending on who is using it when and where. Even lawyers often
use it in its general sense, and indeed are not always clear in their own minds in which
sense it is being used." Id. at 56.
22. See Robert Bruss, Pest Control: Eliminating Neighborhood Nuisance May Take
A Trip to Court, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 1994, at 7C (noting that the Lew case is an example
of both public and private nuisance).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821E (1977).
24. KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 87, at 619-20.
25. See id. (listing kinds of invasion on the enjoyment of land).
26. Kramer v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 19 A.2d 362, 363 (Pa. 1941). See generally 5
RICHARD R POWELL & PATRICK T. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 704[4][d]
(MB 1995).
27. KEETON Er AL., supra note 21, § 87, at 618. To grant a remedy to one whose
rights have been violated requires proof that the individual resides in the immediate
vicinity of the alleged nuisance. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 47 (1989). See infra note
32 and accompanying text.
The Restatement defines a private nuisance as "a nontrespassory invasion of another's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821D (1977).
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Prosser and Keeton note four requirements which must be met in
order to sustain an action for private nuisance.28 First, the defendant
must intend to interfere with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs
land.29 This requirement may be met simply by proving the defendant
has full knowledge that harm to the plaintiffs property is occurring or
is substantially certain to follow.a Second, of course, the plaintiff must
suffer some interference with the use and enjoyment of his land.3' This
means that for a private nuisance to be actionable, the interference must
be "specially injurious" to the individual because of the proximity of the
nuisance to that individual's home.32 Third, the interference that results
must be substantial.3 Finally, the interference must be unreasonable.34
For a detailed discussion of the difference between trespass and nuisance, see KEETON
ET AL., supra note 21, § 87, at 622 ("The difference is that between walking across
[plaintiff's own] lawn and establishing a bawdy house next door. . .
28. KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 87, at 622-23.
29. Id. § 87, at 622.
30. Id. § 87, at 624-25. See, e.g., Padilla v. Lawrence, 685 P.2d 964, 968 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1984) (stating that intentional conduct may be shown if defendants know or should
have known the conduct interfered with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of land; plaintiff
need not prove defendant intended to offend); Hughes v. Emerald Mines Corp., 450 A.2d
1, 4-5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (adopting the same view).
Courts may impose a strict liability standard if they find that the defendant engaged in
"abnormally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous activity." State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v.
Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 159-60 (N.J. 1983) (concluding that dumping toxic waste
in the ground is abnormally dangerous activity carrying strict liability for resulting harm).
31. KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 87, at 622. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821D (1977) (defining private nuisance).
32. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 47 (1989). Similarly, the term "special damages" has
been held to mean those damages suffered by an individual, including personal injury and
property damages, in excess of those suffered by the public generally. See Spencer, supra
note 21, at 74-75. Prosser uses the term "particular damages" to distinguish from the term
"special damages" used in other legal actions. William L. Prosser, Private Action for
Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 997 (1966).
33. KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 87, at 622-23, "Substantial simply means a
significant harm to the plaintiff .... Id, § 88, at 626. The Restatement uses the word
"significant" instead of "substantial." See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 821B(2)(a), 821F (1977).
A substantial interference will not be found if the harm complained of is trivial. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 88, at 626 ("The law does not concern itself with trifles,
or seek to remedy all the petty annoyances and disturbances of everyday life in a civilized
community . . . ."). However, the harm need not be actual if the threat of harm is great
enough. See New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1361 (2d
Cir. 1989) (sustaining permanent injunction against Operation Rescue based, in part, on
New York City's public nuisance claim), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Village of
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Public nuisance, on the other hand, is a much broader concept than
private nuisance.35 A public or common nuisance affects the rights of
the entire community.36 The remedy is traditionally sought by the
state.37  A public nuisance has been defined as an interference with
public health, public safety, public morals, or public peace.3' A private
Wilsonville v. SCA Servs. Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 836 (III. 1981) ("The defendant may be
restrained from entering upon an activity where it is highly probable that it will lead to a
nuisance .... ") (citation omitted).
34. KEETON Er AL., supra note 21, § 87, at 623. The defendant's conduct need not
be unreasonable. Only the nature, duration, or amount of interference must be
unreasonable. Id. (distinguishing intentional conduct from unreasonable interference). The
Restatement lists the following factors as indicators of unreasonableness in the case of
public nuisance:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public
convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative
regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent
or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a
significant effect upon the public right.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B(2) (1977).
35. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 90, at 643; Abrams & Washington,
supra note 21, at 364-67 (discussing differences between public and private nuisance).
36. Abrams & Washington, supra note 21, at 364. The Restatement defines a public
nuisance as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1977).
See also Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 712 P.2d
914, 917 (Ariz. 1985) (stating "[a] public nuisance must... affect a considerable number
of people"); Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 1977)
(describing public nuisance, inter alia, as conduct which injures the "property, health,
safety or comfort of a considerable number of persons" (citations omitted). But see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (1977) ("It is not ... necessary that
the entire community be affected ... so long as the nuisance will interfere with ... the
exercise of a public right . .. ").
37. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 90, at 643 (discussing remedies available to
state and other governmental units); United States v. Olin Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1301, 1305
(N.D. Ala. 1985) (discussing states' use of parenspatriae suits to enjoin public nuisances);
Missouri ex rel. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1980) (citing statute
assigning to the attorney general authority to bring civil suits to protect state's interests).
38. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 35 (1989). Some writers have stated that a
characteristic that distinguishes a public nuisance from a private nuisance is that a public
nuisance is a crime. See, e.g., Prosser, supra note 32, at 997 (writing that "[a] public...
nuisance is always a crime"). However, public nuisance is frequently brought as a civil
action in certain jurisdictions. See People v. Markovitz, 423 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1979) (noting that an injunction is a civil remedy, which requires a less stringent
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person may only maintain an action for public nuisance if the public
nuisance is "specially injurious" to himself or his property.39
Public nuisance statutes trace their roots back to early common
law,4" when nuisance involved only an interference with another's
property rights.4' Statutory versions of the common law eventually
began to regulate conduct42 directly, rather than merely the interference
with another's use and enjoyment of their land. These statutes,
historically directed at protecting public morality,43 included the
tobacco44 and alcohol ordinances45 of the nineteenth century, the Red
standard of proof than a criminal conviction). See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming injunction against owner of real estate
containing hazardous waste in pendent state law public nuisance claim).
39. KEETON Er AL., supra note 21, § 90, at 646 (stating that a private plaintiff bringing
a public nuisance suit must show injury distinct from that sustained by the general public).
This action is distinct from the government's public nuisance actions. The action, often
termed a "public nuisance tort," arises only when a private citizen shows special damages
against a public nuisance. Id. § 90, at 647 (noting general agreement that plaintiff's
injuries must differ in kind, not merely degree, from those of the general public). A
showing that a public nuisance also interferes with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the
land, and thus constitutes a private nuisance, sustains a public nuisance action.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. e (1977). See also William B. Johnson,
Annotation, What Constitutes Special Injury that Entitles Private Party to Maintain Action
Based on Public Nuisance-Modern Cases, 71 A.L.R.4TH 13, § 2[b], at 23-24 (1989)
(noting advantages of public nuisance claim by private plaintiff, including that statute of
limitations does not run against the public right); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Public
Nuisance: A Crime in Tort Law, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 318, 322-32 (1978) (discussing the
criminality requirement under public nuisance actions brought by the state or by private
plaintiffs).
40. For example, early statutes permitted civil and criminal actions for keeping
"disorderly houses." B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture
Standards Imposing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 679, 723 (1992). One case describes a "disorderly house" as a place "kept in such
a way as to disturb, annoy, and scandalize the public generally or the neighborhood, or the
passers-by on a highway .... Mossman v. City of Ft. Collins, 90 P. 605, 606 (Colo.
1907) (internal quotations omitted).
41. For a discussion of the expansion of the nuisance concept beyond protection of
property rights, see Glesner, supra note 40, at 716-17.
42. Glesner, supra note 40, at 723-24 (discussing laws and ordinances regulating
alcohol, tobacco, narcotics, and prostitution). See generally Jerome H. Skolnick, The
Social Transformation of Vice, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1988) (discussing the
history of vice control in the United States).
43. Glesner, supra note 40, at 723-24.
44. See, e.g., Austin v. State, 48 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1898) (upholding ordinance
restricting the sale of cigarettes), aftd, 179 U.S. 343 (1900).
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Light Abatement Acts of the early twentieth century,46 and the liquor
control statutes of the prohibition era.47 Historically, nuisance law was
used to close down brothels, speak-easies, and gambling dens. Today,
nuisance law may be used to close down drug houses and gang
headquarters.48
III. LANDLORD LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
This Note is concerned with a particular category of nuisance:
nuisance resulting from criminal activity occurring on a landlord's or
neighbor's property, particularly patterns of violence related to drug
dealing and street gangs. Issues of landlord liability with respect to such
alleged nuisance properties arise in two contexts. First, tenants often sue
their landlords when criminal activity takes place on the leased property
45. See generally Henry Schofield, Equity Jurisdiction to Abate and Enjoin Illegal
Saloons as Public Nuisances, 8 ILL. L. REv. 19 (1913) (discussing alcohol ordinances of
the nineteenth century).
46. Glesner, supra note 40, at 724. These statutes regulated prostitution houses. Id.
at 724 n.243. See, e.g., Nuisances: To Enjoin and Abate Houses ofLewdness, Assignation
and Prostitution, 1921 Mo. Laws 523 (codified as amended at MO. REV. STAT. § 567.080
(1979)). The current statute defines "[a]ny room, building or other structure regularly used
for sexual contact for pay ... or any unlawful prostitution activity ... " as a public
nuisance. Mo. REv. STAT. § 567.080.1 (1994).
47. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 4943 (1939) (current version at Mo. REv.
STAT. § 311.740 (1994)). This statute states:
[A]ny room, house, building, boat, vehicle, structure or place of any kind where
intoxicating liquor is sold, manufactured, kept for sale or bartered ... and all
intoxicating liquors and all property kept and used in maintaining such a place
... is hereby declared to be a public and common nuisance ....
Id.
48. Michelle J. Stahl, Comment, Oscar v. University Students Cooperative Ass'n: Can
Citizens Use RICO to Rid Neighborhoods of Drug Houses?, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 799,
799-800 (1992).
In 1987, Portland, Oregon became one of the first major cities to use its public nuisance
abatement laws to close drug houses. Now, Cities Hit Drug Suspects Where They Live,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 25, 1991, at B16. Since 1987, Portland has applied its ordinance over
700 times and other cities have followed. Id.
In addition, neighbors often sue owners of nuisance properties for damages. Hart, supra
note 15, at GI. See also Katherine Bishop, Neighbors in West Use Small Claims Court
to Combat Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1989, at A16 (noting recent nuisance actions in
small claims courts against owners of buildings that housed drug related activity). For
examples of the widespread media coverage such cases have received in California, see
infra note 133.
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and results in violence.49 Placing a duty upon the landlord to reason-
ably protect his tenants from foreseeable criminal acts committed on the
leased premises is an appropriate extension of the landlord's common
law duties in light of modem concerns with crime." The second
context implicates a landlord's duty to protect neighbors from the
activities of tenants"' and others.52
A. Tenants Suing Landlords:
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.
Courts have found it to be a landlord's duty to protect tenants from
criminal activity by third parties under a number of theories, including
breach of an express or implied obligation imposed by a lease, breach of
a statutory duty, and under tort principles of foreseeability.53 This
section discusses the broad trend toward finding landlord liability on the
basis of the foreseeable risks to tenants.
The 1970 case of Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment
Corp. 4 was the first to successfully establish a landlord's tort liability
49. Historically, tenants in such actions offered several different theories to justify
landlord liability in tort for third party criminal activities. See generally Gary D. Spivey,
Annotation, Landlord's Obligation to Protect Tenant Against Criminal Activities of Third
Persons, 43 A.L.R.3D 331 (1972) (discussing landlord duty, breach, and remedies). These
include claims based on contract and misrepresentation. Glesner, supra note 40, at 686-
87. In addition, tenants have pursued claims of liability through defenses based on
constructive eviction and the implied warranty of habitability. Id. See, e.g., Fidelity Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Kaminsky, 768 S.W.2d 818, 823 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding
constructive eviction defense on the basis of landlord's failure to stop protesters on
premises); Blaustein v. Gilbert-Dallas Co., 749 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(finding a duty based on express lease provisions in an action brought by tenant raped on
premises). However, most theories developing the landlord's duty have arisen as
negligence actions. Glesner, supra note 40, at 688.
50. See generally Miriam J. Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs of
Crime?, 2 CARDOZO L. REv. 299, 300 (1981) (arguing for landlord duty to protect tenants
from foreseeable crimes on the leased premises).
51. See Glesner, supra note 40, at 716-40 (discussing landlord liability for public
nuisances caused by tenants).
52. See, e.g., Kelly v. Boys' Club of St. Louis, Inc., 588 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (permitting damage claim for nuisance for property allowed to deteriorate,
inviting vandalism and dumping).
53. See generally, Spivey, supra note 49, § 2 (outlining circumstances under which
courts have found a duty to protect tenants).
54. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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to tenants for a third party's criminal actions."5 The Kline court held
that the landlord, although not an insurer of the tenant's safety, must take
steps within his power to minimize the risk of crime against his tenants'
persons and their property when he has knowledge of the insufficiency
of existing security measures. 6 The court established a test based on
foreseeability to determine when the risk of crime creates liability for a
landlord who fails to take reasonable measures to protect his tenants."
To successfully pass this foreseeability-based test, a tenant must prove
that there was a defect on the premises, that the landlord had control
over and knowledge of the defect, and that the defect foreseeably
enhanced the risk of criminal activity.5
As the Kline case illustrates, a recent trend has broadened landlord
responsibility for criminal activity on rented property. 59 As a result,
55. Haines, supra note 50, at 299. The plaintiff sued her landlord for injuries
sustained after she was criminally assaulted and robbed in a common hallway. Kline, 439
F.2d at 478. The circuit court found "that there [was] a duty of protection owed by the
landlord to the tenant... :'
56. Kline, 439 F.2d. at 481. The court examined traditional principles of landlord-
tenant law in the context of modem urban apartment living. Id. The court noted that
some duties arise out of the landlord's control over common areas of the property. Id. at
480, 482. The court also cited precedent establishing an implied contract requiring the
landlord to provide reasonable protective measures. Id. at 485 (citing Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970)). Finally, the court analogized to the
common law duty of the innkeeper to protect guests form criminal acts by third parties.
Kline, 439 F.2d at 482, 485. See also, Haines, supra note 50, at 317-19.
57. Id. at 487 ("The risk of criminal assault and robbery on any tenant was clearly
predictable .... ."). Kline has been criticized as difficult to apply, because it "is unclear
as to what protective measures are necessary to meet the standard of care enunciated."
Haines, supra note 50, at 350.
58. Glesner, supra note 40, at 690. See Kline, 439 F.2d at 487. For example, in
Kline, the landlord exclusively controlled the areas in need of protection and knew of other
tenants who had been criminally assaulted and robbed. Id. at 479-80. Nevertheless, the
landlord failed to take adequate security measures, and in fact reduced existing security,
leaving entrances unguarded and unlocked much of the time. Id. at 479.
59. See generally Glesner, supra note 40, at 684-99 (discussing the duty to protect
tenants). See also Holley v. Mount Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98, 100
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (reversing summary judgment for landlord on finding that it had
previously supplied guards and may have passed security costs on to tenants); Brock v.
Watts Realty Co., 582 So. 2d 438 (Ala. 1991) (reversing summary judgment for landlord
in suit brought by administrix of murdered tenant's estate, holding that landlord had a duty
to the tenant to maintain locks); Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Mo. 1988)
(stating that landlord has a duty to use due care to make common premises safe against
foreseeable risks).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/9
BRINGING NEIGHBORS TOGETHER
landlords have been increasingly exposed to both civil and criminal
liability for the criminal activities occurring on their properties.' For
example, the New York case of Jacqueline S. v. City of New York6
extended the evidence necessary to demonstrate foreseeable risk to
include past criminal activity occurring in close proximity to a rented
property, but not necessarily in the exact location." In this case, a
fourteen-year-old tenant sued the landlord of her housing complex for
negligence when she was abducted and raped by an assailant inside her
apartment building." The tenant produced evidence that previous
violent criminal activity had occurred in several of the housing complex
buildings."4 In holding that a triable issue of foreseeability of assault
on a tenant existed, the New York Court of Appeals emphasized that the
operative proof need not be limited to crimes actually occurring in the
specific building where the attack took place.65 By ruling that evidence
60. For an exhaustive review of landlord liability and a criticism of the broadening of
such liability, see Glesner, supra note 40.
61. 614 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1993).
62. Id. at 726. At issue was whether a tenant in a multi-building apartment complex
had to show that previous criminal acts had occurred in her building from which she was
abducted. Id. at 725. The court refused to so limit the foreseeability rule, noting a high
number of similar crimes within the housing project. Id. After Kline, cases began to
include evidence that a building was located in a high crime area or that previous attacks
had occurred in the area, because such knowledge is relevant to the issue of foreseeability.
See generally Spivey, supra note 49, § 8 (collecting cases applying the foreseeability test).
63. Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 582 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992),
rev'd, 614 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1993).
64. Jacqueline S., 614 N.E.2d at 724. A Housing Authority police officer testified that
she had responded to several reports of forcible rapes and 20 or more forcible robberies
prior to the attack on the plaintiff. Id. The tenant provided evidence of dangerous
conditions in her building. Id. The assistant building superintendent testified that drug
paraphernalia, drug addicts, and intruders could be found "all over the place.' Id. Despite
these conditions, the door to the lobby was not locked, and security personnel were not
stationed in the building. Id.
The Appellate Division granted summary judgment for the defendant landlord, holding
that the evidence was insufficient to make the crime reasonably foreseeable in the tenant's
own building. Id. at 727. It therefore applied a "minimal" safety standard to determine
the landlord's duty, and found the landlord met that duty. Jacqueline S., 582 N.Y.S.2d at
698-99.
65. Jacqueline S., 614 N.E.2d at 725-26. The court also held that the evidence need
not be of the same type of criminal conduct. Id. at 726. Rather, the court held that the
sufficiency of such evidence depends on the location, nature, and extent of the previous
criminal activity, as well as its similarity, proximity, or other relationship to the crime in
question. Id.
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of prior criminal activity occurring in or around the premises may be
admitted, this decision further broadened landlord liability for the actions
of third persons.
B. Neighbors Suing Landlords for Maintaining Nuisance Properties
Some courts have gone even further than Kline and Jacqueline S. in
expanding landlord liability. Rather than holding landlords responsible
exclusively to their own tenants, courts have begun to hold landlords
responsible to neighbors of their property as well. This line of cases
constitutes the second context under which landlords may be held liable
for crimes committed on their properties.
In 1979, in Kelly v. Boys' Club of St. Louis, Inc.,' the Missouri
Court of Appeals applied a test similar to the Kline foreseeable risk test
to hold the owner of a nuisance property responsible to his neighbors. 67
John and Janice Kelly, owners of a home in the Soulard Historic District
in the city of St. Louis, sued their neighbors, the Boys' Club of St.
Louis, under a nuisance theory. 8 The Kellys alleged that the neighbor-
ing property had become a health hazard and a haven for vandals,
arsonists, and undesirables. 9 Unlike the Kline and Jacqueline S. cases,
a criminal attack had not occurred. Rather, the plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief to require the owner of the Boys' Club property to
preserve the property, and damages for nuisance and emotional
distress.7"
The dissent found this test to be overly vague as well as broad, and asserted that the
court's ruling would render the landlord "an unlimited insurer of the safety of its premises
against urban crime." Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 614 N.E.2d 723, 726 (N.Y.
1993) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
66. 588 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
67. Id. at 257.
68. Id. at 255.
69. Id. at 255-56. The plaintiffs alleged the Boys' Club "permitted the buildings to
deteriorate by evicting the tenants, by inviting the public to remove whatever they desired
from the buildings, by failing to secure or board up the buildings, by permitting weeds to
grow upon the property and by permitting the property to be used for dumping rubbish and
noxious materials." Id. at 255.
70. Id. The plaintiffs sought actual and punitive damages, alleging their home had
been damaged, their personal property had been stolen, and their peace had been disturbed,
impairing their health, and reducing their property's value. Id. at 256.
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The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis dismissed the complaint,
and the plaintiffs appealed.7 The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed,
focusing on the fact that the property owners had intentionally and
deliberately allowed their property to seriously deteriorate.72 According
to the court, the landowners permitted the property to become a haven
for criminals, to the detriment of their neighbors.73 Therefore, the
Boys' Club could not blame the resulting nuisance on the criminal
activities caused by third parties.74 Like the Kline court, the Kelly court
held that the requisite causal connection had been met because "the
defendants had reasonable anticipation of harm and failed to exercise
reasonable care to avert such harm."75
The California Court of Appeal employed similar reasoning in the
recent case of Lew v. Superior Court.76 In Lew, seventy-five neighbors
of an apartment complex sued the landlords of the complex for mental
distress caused by the illegal activities occurring on and near the
landlords' nuisance property.77  The plaintiffs claimed that the
landlords' failure to combat a drug-dealing operation on the property
created a nuisance.7 Neither the dealers, their customers, nor the
71. Kelly, 588 S.W.2d at 255.
72. Id. at 257 ("A property owner cannot knowingly allow his property to become a
haven for criminals to the detriment of his neighbors and deny that his property has
become a nuisance because the resulting criminal activities are those of third parties:').
The nuisance count included allegations that the Boys' Club violated city ordinances and
refused to permit other persons to protect the property. Id. at 256.
73. Id. at 257.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citation omitted).
76. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
77. Id. at 43. California's Health & Safety Code § 11570 specifically declared that
properties used for the manufacture, storage, or sale of controlled substances were
nuisances. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11570 (West 1991). After losing in small
claims court and at trial de novo in the Alameda County Superior Court, the landlords
appealed. Lew, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43-44. They asserted that they were not responsible
for the tortious acts of third parties, id. at 44, and that the California nuisance statute
§ 11570 provided only for abatement, not the actual and punitive damages awarded to
plaintiffs. Id. at 45.
78. Id. at 43-44. Several plaintiffs submitted affidavits asserting they had been
confronted by drug dealers, drug customers, and prostitutes. Id. at 43. Such confronta-
tions, along with the sounds of gun shots, fighting, and yelling, caused the tenants to fear
for their lives. Id. at 43-44. One neighbor testified that his child was unable to play in
the front yard because of the pervasive illegal activity. Id. at 44.
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neighboring residents were tenants of the landlords.79 Nevertheless, the
court found the landlords had not acted reasonably in dealing with the
problem.8" The court of appeal therefore affirmed a judgment for the
plaintiffs totaling $218,325.81
Like the Kelly court, the Lew court emphasized that the plaintiffs
were not seeking to recover for the criminal acts of the third parties, but
rather for the acts of the landlords in maintaining their property as a
nuisance.8" The owners failed to do what a reasonable person under the
same or similar circumstances would have done.83 Because the
defendants acted negligently in their management of the property, the
court did not have to face the more difficult question of whether to
impose liability on owners whose property has become a nuisance
through no fault of their own."
The Lew case signifies a tremendous increase in the duty of property
owners to protect others from criminal activity. 5 Once the court found
that the owners had been negligent in their management of the property
79. Id. The landlords argued that under California law, they were not responsible for
the tortious acts of third parties committed off the landlord's property. Id.
80. Id. at 47. The court rejected the landlords' argument that their property was not
a haven for drug activity. Id. The court further rejected the landlords' claim of inability
to prevent the nuisance activity. Id.
81. Lew, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 44, 47. The landlords also argued, unsuccessfully, that
the California statute finding criminal activity to be a nuisance allowed only an abatement
action, not an action in damages. Id. at 45 (addressing sections of the California Health
and Safety Code). The court held nothing in the statutory scheme foreclosed the lesser
remedy of a private action for damages in small claims court. Id. The relevant section
of the California Health and Safety Code provides that the remedies for such an action
"shall be in addition to any other existing remedies for nuisance abatement actions .. .
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11573.5(0 (West Supp. 1996).
82. Lew, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46. The court below found that the landlords failed to
take necessary remedial steps, such as installing a key-card gate or hiring a live-in manager
to manage their property. Id. at 44, 47.
83. Id. at 47. The lower court had found that the owners "knew or should have
known" of the illegal activity and consequent problems. Id. at 44.
84. Id. at 46. This statement may indicate the court's belief that the injury might not
have been compensable without evidence of landowner negligence. However, for a
discussion of strict liability placed on landlords for maintaining nuisance properties, see
Glesner, supra note 40, at 734-35 (discussing various treatments of landlords' knowledge
of or participation in illegal activities on their properties).
85. Tenants Can Sue Landlord Over Drugs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 2, 1993,
at A4 (noting the important precedent set by the Lew case).
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by failing to take reasonable steps to stop the drug dealing,86 it in effect
held the owners liable for the acts of the third-party drug dealers, even
when some of these acts were committed off of the owners' property.87
Furthermore, the court held the landlords responsible for emotional
distress caused by the drug-dealing activity on their property."8 Unlike
other nuisance cases that found an increased risk of violence due to
previous acts of violence,89 the Lew case was based on mental, rather
than physical, attacks.'
Landowner tort liability has increased significantly in recent years.
This increase is partly due to the expansion of the scope of a landlord's
duty of care from its initial focus on the physical condition of the
premises to its current concern with overall residential safety.9' This
tremendous expansion of a landlord's duty to protect both tenants and
neighbors has been criticized as wrongfully requiring landlords to control
the conduct of others.' Critics argue that the nature of a landlord's
duty is confined to controlling and maintaining the physical condition of
the leased premises so as to prevent crime.93 Furthermore, a broad
landlord duty to control the actions of third parties ignores an important
distinction between requiring a landlord to act once a dangerous
condition becomes apparent, and encouraging a landlord to prospectively
86. Lew, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46-47.
87. See supra note 79.
88. Lew, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46 ("The mental suffering which is the main component
of the [alleged] injuries ... is compensable under a nuisance theory."). See also supra
notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing the alleged mental suffering).
89. For a sample of such cases, see supra note 59.
90. Lew, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46.
91. See generally Olin L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of
Landlords, 81 MIcH. L. REv. 99, 109-16 (1982) (discussing the expansion of landlord
duty); Haines, supra note 50, at 353-56 (arguing for legislative alternatives to the judicial
imposition of landlord liability when crime occurs on the leased premises).
92. See generally Glesner, supra note 40, at 758-64 (examining the shift from an
individualist ideology to a communalist ideology in the analysis of landlord liability). See
also Jacqueline S. v. City of New York, 614 N.E.2d 723, 726 (N.Y. 1993) (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting) (arguing this expansion "imposes a sweeping negligence liability burden of
impossible practical and functional dimensions...").
93. See Glesner, supra note 40, at 784 (stating that enforcing minimum standards of
property maintenance is preferable to expanding landowner liability to combat crime).
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prevent risk by discriminating against certain types of tenants.94 For
these reasons, plaintiffs must still produce some evidence of criminal
activity occurring on the defendant's property, a threat to their safety, or
an interference with the use and enjoyment of their property, in order to
bring a criminal nuisance claim. 95
IV. THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND
CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
A. History of RICO
In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act,96
Title IX of which is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (the Act or RICO).97 The Act grants treble damages and attorneys'
fees to persons injured in their business or property due to racketeering
activity.9" By enacting RICO, Congress primarily sought to eradicate
organized crime in the United States.9 However, RICO reaches further
94. Haines, supra note 50, at 345. See Glesner, supra note 40, at 780-82 (discussing
tenant-screening issues).
95. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for
nuisance claims). In Lew, liability was imposed on a theory of active fault on the part of
the defendants in the management of their property. Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr.
2d 42, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. The court
left open the question of how much evidence is actually required. Lew. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 46. The defendants did not attack the sufficiency of the evidence of damage; rather,
they denied their property was a hub of drug activity. Id. The court found this attack to
be without merit. Id.
96. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
97. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides that: "[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1994).
99. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23
(1970). The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose provided in part:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions
and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime.
Id. at 923.
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than its name indicates:"° the Act does not apply solely to organized
criminals.' Rather, RICO prohibits certain behavior and activities
which are characteristic of organized crime. 2 Therefore, plaintiffs
may relatively easily incorporate a RICO count into any civil complaint
against structured criminality, °3 including a suit for nuisance caused
by crime on one's property."°
Several courts attempted to limit the Act's scope by prohibiting the
treble damages remedy against individual defendants. 5 However, the
Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., ° refused to
100. Congress mandated that the courts construe RICO liberally. Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
See G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 103 1-
32 (1980) (arguing that RICO should be construed liberally because its purpose is not to
determine whether conduct is criminal but to impose remedies on conduct already
determined to be criminal).
But see Ethan M. Posner, Note, Clarifying a "Pattern" of Confusion: A Multi-Factor
Approach to Civil RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1745, 1769-70 (1988)
(citing use of RICO to bring suits alleging securities fraud, and in cases involving takeover
battles and matrimonial disputes); Patrick J. Ryan, Note, The Civil RICO Pattern
Requirement: Continuity and Relationship, a Fatal Attraction?, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 955
(1988) (arguing that RICO should be used to target organized criminal activity).
101. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989)
(noting that "Congress... chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it
had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in application to organized crime.");
Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47,49 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (finding
that Congress did not intend to limit the scope of RICO to persons connected with
organized crime).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1095-96 (E.D. Pa.) (noting
that RICO proscribes certain behavior which Congress concluded is commonly engaged
in by members of organized crime), afd 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1072 (1980); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 88, 96 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (arguing that RICO prohibits activities characteristic of organized crime even when
they are engaged in by a single individual).
103. See G. Richard Strafer et al., Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's
Darling." 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 655, 656-57 (1982).
104. E.g., Oscar v. University Students Co-op. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1020 (1992) (discussing financial loss requirement in RICO suit
brought against owners of nuisance property).
105. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1358-64 (S.D.N.Y.)
(denying plaintiff's RICO claim against investment banker's employer following banker's
conviction for securities fraud because there was no racketeering activity), affd, 719 F.2d
5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
106. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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grant this remedial power to the judiciary." 7 Despite its refusal to
preclude private RICO actions against individuals, the Supreme Court
limited the statute by holding that a "pattern of racketeering activity"
requires at least two acts.' 8 These acts must show continuity and be
related to each other."°
B. Oscar v. University Students Co-op. Ass'
A group of tenants in a California apartment building sued the
owner of a neighboring student co-operative, alleging that the students'
illegal activities interfered with the use and enjoyment of their proper-
ty."' The tenants brought their claim under RICO seeking treble
damages."' They alleged decreases in their properties' values." 2
The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim." 3 A
107. Id. at 499-500. The court stated that "[i]t is not for the judiciary to eliminate the
private action in situations where Congress has provided it simply because plaintiffs are
not taking advantage of it in its more difficult application." Id.
108. Id. at 496 n.14. In a footnote, Justice White emphasized that the target of RICO
was not sporadic activity, noting that "[t]he legislative history supports the view that two
[unrelated] acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern." Id.
109. Id.
110. Oscar v. University Students Co-op. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 784 (9th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiffs alleged that the student residents formed a conspiracy to sell drugs. Id. In
furtherance of the conspiracies, the defendants dumped the bodies of persons suffering
from drug overdoses on their neighbors' land. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants were responsible for filth, risk of disease, noise, violence, throwing garbage on
property, urinating on cars, vandalism, as well as numerous other crimes, misdemeanors,
nuisances, and annoyances. Id.
In fact, the student co-operative was known nationally as a "drug den and anarchist
household." Sam Whiting, The Co-Op That Chaos Killed, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1990, at
B3 (quoting neighbors). Nude dinners and other bacchanalian festivals often turned
riotous, bringing the Hall to the attention of the media and police. Id. See also e.g.,
Debra L. Holtz, UC Student Co-Op Wins Fight to Evict Tenants, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 23,
1990, at A4 (reporting that a resident had died after failing off the roof of the building,
and that violent clashes with the police had occurred); The State, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1987, at 2 (reporting that seven people were taken to the hospital from Barrington Hall
after consuming LSD-spiked punch); Jim H. Zamora, Barrington Hall, Once Hotbed of UC
Radicalism, Closes, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at A3 (reporting confrontation between
police and 500 people at Barrington Hall).
111. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). Under § 1964(c), plaintiffs who prove damages
as a result of racketeering activities may recover treble damages. See supra note 98 for
text of § 1964(c).
112. Oscar, 965 F.2d at 786.
113. Id. at 784.
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three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed." 4 However, on rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit
held that Oscar had not demonstrated financial loss, a requirement for
recovery under RICO." 5 In so holding, the Court emphasized that
RICO was not intended to grant a federal cause of action and the
recovery of treble damages to every personal injury plaintiff; rather, its
intent was to thwart organized crime and to prevent the criminal invasion
of legitimate businesses and property." 6
The dissent in Oscar disagreed with the majority's narrow construc-
tion of RICO damages." 7 The dissent argued that the statute was
intended precisely to rescue and grant recovery to neighbors suing
narcotics dealers who reduce the quality of life in their neighbor-
hood."" The dissent, therefore, would not have imposed the tangible-
financial-loss requirement, " and would have allowed Oscar to recover
114. Oscar v. University Students Co-op. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1991). The
court found (1) plaintiffs had a property interest under state law despite being renters, id.
at 810-11; (2) this interest was protected by RICO, id. at 811; and (3) the racketeering
activities were the direct cause of plaintiffs' injuries, id. at 813. The court held, however,
that RICO could not compensate for "unneighborly conduct;" i.e., "filth, risk of disease,
and noise .... violence, [the] throwing of garbage on [their] property, people urinating
on cars parked at [their property], vandalism, and burglary." Id. (alterations in original)
(internal quotations omitted).
115. Oscar v. University Students Co-op. Ass'n, 965 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1992) (en
banc). The court noted two limitations on the tenant's potential recovery under RICO.
First, the court stated that "a showing of'injury' requires proof of concrete financial loss,
and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest." Id. at 785 (internal
quotations omitted). Because the tenant rented the apartment, and did not own it, she
could not receive the diminution in fair market value. Id. at 786-87.
Second, the court asserted that "personal injuries are not compensable under RICO."
Id. at 785 (citing cases denying recovery). The court categorized the tenant's loss as
"personal discomfort and annoyance" due to the nuisance. Id. at 787. Though such
injuries may support a nuisance claim, they are not compensable under RICO. Id.
116. Id. at 786 (citing Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918-19 (3d Cir.
1991) (explaining that RICO plaintiffs may recover damages for harm to business and
property only)).
117. Oscar, 965 F.2d at 788 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
118. Id. The dissent argued that "Congress has not authorized us to erect this door
and shut it on a kind of case most central to achieving the purposes of the statute.' Id.
119. Id. The dissent emphasized that "damages for injury to property are generally
measured other than by realized financial loss." Id. The dissent turned to the statutory
language itself and noted that § 1964(c) allows recovery for anyone "injured in his ...
property." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). The statute does not impose a requirement
of "consequent financial loss." Id.
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treble damages as a reward for turning in the racketeers. 12  The
confusion caused by the varying interpretations of RICO is not unique
to the Ninth Circuit: A consistent definition of "pattem"' 2' and other
RICO requirements has eluded the courts for years and has spawned
endless debate among commentators.
V. PROPOSALS
A. Amendment to Missouri Revised Statute Section 82.1025
The purpose of this Note is to explore means by which the residents
of Missouri's inner cities can combat the spread of crime and danger that
attends the presence of drug houses. Thus, this section turns to an
examination of two existing mechanisms. First, Missouri Revised Statute
section 82.1025 permits suits against nuisance property owners in small
claims court. Second, Missouri also has nuisance abatement statutes
which provide limited remedies against nuisance properties. Both
approaches can be modified to make them more effective tools in
neighborhood restoration.
In 1989, Lonnie Snelling, a St. Louis City resident, sued the Land
Clearance for Redevelopment Authority (LCRA) under a nuisance
theory."2 Snelling presented evidence that the property was in "a high
crime area and not a desirable place to live."'" He alleged that the
nuisance decreased the value of his property and made it unrentable1 24
Unlike the plaintiffs in the Kelly case, 21 Snelling offered no evidence
120. Oscar, 965 F.2d at 798. The dissent here noted that RICO is more than a
"compensatory statute federalizing nuisance law." Id. The treble damages provision
makes plaintiffs private attorneys general. Id. The dissent further asserted that, "[t]he
rewards, enhancement ofproperty values in neighborhoods liberated from criminals beyond
what they were when the plaintiffs moved in, and money for the tenants and their lawyers
who pursue this worthy objective, are incentives precisely within the statutory purpose."
Id.
121. See Posner, supra note 100, at 1748 (noting that the United States Supreme Court
opinion in Sedima increased confusion regarding the refunded level of wrongful activity);
Ryan, supra note 100, at 956 (noting four views on the correct interpretation of RICO's
pattern requirement).
122. See Snelling v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority for the City of St.
Louis, 793 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Kelly v. Boys' Club of St. Louis, Inc., 588 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Kelly case). Note that Kelly
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that the property had deteriorated or that the defendant had violated any
city ordinances. 2s The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis therefore
held that Snelling had failed to prove the existence of a nuisance.127
The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that Snelling had not
established that the LCRA was "in any way responsible for the alleged
nuisance."' 2 "
The obvious flaw in Snelling's case was his lack of proof. He was
a pro se plaintiff with a heavy burden. 29  Had he united with his
neighbors, as the plaintiffs did in Lew,'3" his case would have been
much stronger. Lew demonstrates that organized neighbors of drug-
infested buildings that produce a spillover of violence can successfully
sue the property owners under a nuisance theory in small claims
court. "' Not only have the Lew court and others held responsible
those landlords who ignored the problems, a2 but the media have also
given these suits extensive coverage.'33
was also tried in the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals, eleven years prior
to the Snelling case.
126. Snelling, 793 S.W.2d at 232. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
127. Snelling, 793 S.W.2d at 232.
128. Id. The Court of Appeals also stated that Snelling offered no evidence of
LCRA's ownership or control of the alleged nuisance property. Id.
129. Id. A pro se plaintiff is one who appears in court on his own behalf, without a
lawyer. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990).
130. Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
131. See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text for discussion of the Lew case.
132. See supra part III for a complete discussion of landlord liability for criminal
activity and common law nuisance.
133. An overwhelming majority of the media coverage involves claims in California.
See Berkeley Landlord Sued for $5,000-67 Times, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 1991, at A26;
L.A. Chung, S.F. Agency Sued Over Hayes Valley Project Crime, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 24,
1990, at B12; Drug House Owner Loses Appeal of Suit, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 15, 1990, at
A 1l; Pamela Fitzsimmons, Neighbors Battle Owner Over Tenants, SAN BERNARDINO
COUNTY SUN, May 6, 1994, at B8; Norman E. Frowley, Case Puts Landlords on Notice:
Evidence of Crime in Neighborhood Opens Door to Liability, N.Y. L.J., July 28, 1993, at
5; Stephanie B. Goldberg, Bad Neighbors: Landlords Liable for Drug-Dealing on
Premises, A.B.AJ., Feb. 1994, at 95; Len Hall, Neighbors Win Big in Small-Claims Case,
L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 19, 1995, at B1; Reynolds Holding, 41 Awards in Suits Against Drug
House, S.F. CHRON., May 25, 1991, at A15; Reynolds Holding, Rooming House is a
"Nuisance, " Neighbors Tell Court in S.F., S.F. CHRON., May 15, 1991, at AI5; Patricia
Jacobus, Oakland Goes After Gang with Lawsuit: Nuisance Law Used Against "B Street
Boys," S.F. CHRON., May 21, 1994, at A17; Landlord Held Liable for Tolerating Gangs,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1990, at B2; John H. Lee, Landlord Appeals Rulingfor Tenants, L.A.
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A common denominator of the widely publicized cases is their
genesis in the small claims court. The small claims court has provided
a form of alternative dispute resolution in the United States for almost
a century.'34 Small claims cases offer an appealing alternative to class
action suits because the system is inexpensive, informal, and expedi-
ent.135 The small claims court system was originally designed to
handle cases involving small amounts of money or plaintiffs who were
too poor to sue under the existing judicial system.'36 The system
strove to simplify court procedures, eliminate lawyers, and grant some
bargaining power to poor plaintiffs.'37  Like class actions suits, 38
small claims court cases offer an arena for community organizing and
empowerment.'39 Unlike class actions, however, small claims cases
promote self-representation. This in turn allows plaintiffs to feel more
in control of their case, which is important to most litigants.4 °
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1990, at B8; George Markell, Neighbors Win Suit Over Crime: SF
Housing Authority Ruled Liable for Assaults Near Project, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 1990, at
A2; Toni Minton, The $4 Solution: 4 Plan to Get Drugs Out of Your Neighborhood, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 11, 1990, at B3; Residents Near Crime-Ridden SF Housing Project Win
Claim, S.F. CHRON., May 1, 1990, at A9; David A. Self, Wrong Way to Safe Streets:
Small-Claims Crusade in Oakland Blames Crime Wave on Landlords, L.A. DAILY J., July
19, 1993, at 6; Daryl Strickland, Oakland Fights Back in Small Claims Court, SEATrLE
TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1994, at B2; Janet Wells, New Weapon in Drug War, S.F. CHRON., Dec.
27, 1993, at A15; Maitland Zane, Landlady Fights Judgment on Boarded-Up Crack House,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 10, 1990, at A4; Maitland Zane, Neighbors Sue Owner of Tenderloin
Hotel, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1994, at A33.
134. Susan E. Raitt et al., The Use of Mediation in Small Claims Court, 9 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 55 (1993). See generally Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute
Processing: Litigation in Small Claims Court, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 339 (1976)
(presenting a case study of small-claims court cases).
135. Raitt et al., supra note 134, at 55.
136. See Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes:
.4 Review of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & SOC'y REv. 219, 222-24 (1975). See
also Andrew D. Freeman & Juli E. Farris, Grassroots Impact Litigation: Mass Filing of
Small Claims, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 261 (1992) (comparing class-actioon suits with mass pro
se small-claims suits).
137. See Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 136, at 222-24.
138. See Lynn Mather, Conclusion: The Mobilizing Potential of Class Actions, 57 IND.
L.J. 451, 451 (1982) (providing examples of attempts to promote change through class
action suits).
139. See Freeman & Farris, supra note 136, at 261-62 (comparing class action and
small claims suits).
140. See generally, Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by
Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103, 121
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During the summer of 1994, Missouri passed a new law which
allows property owners of nearby buildings to sue owners of nuisance
properties in a small claims court."' The law defines a nuisance
property as one that "adversely affects the property values of a neighbor-
hood" because certain acts or omissions by the owner have caused it to
be in a "deteriorated condition, not consistent with the general neighbor-
hood."' 42 The law grants such a cause of action to property owners
who live within a reasonable distance of an alleged nuisance proper-
ty.'43 Claimants may sue for the diminution in property value caused
by the nuisance, provided that they have given the owner a reasonable
opportunity to correct the alleged nuisance.'"
This law provides a useful tool for individuals to help neighborhood
associations and aldermen fight the owners of deteriorated properties.
4
1
However, the history of nuisance law shows that public nuisance laws
were intended to combat certain illegal uses of property which threaten
public health, morals, safety, or peace. 46 Residents may want to sue
their neighbors for allowing property to become a haven for drug dealers
and organized criminals, rather than for allowing trash to build up on the
property.' Furthermore, considering the modem trend in expanding
(1988) (reporting results of study that indicates that legal clients often care most about the
process by which their problems are resolved).
141. Act of July 12, 1994, 1994 Mo. Laws 354, 357 (nuisance action for deteriorated
property) (codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 82.1025 (1994)).
142. Mo. REV. STAT. § 82.1025 (1994). These acts and omissions include: "neglect,
abandonment, failure to repair after a fire, flood or some other damage to the property or
because the resident of the property allows clutter on the property such as abandoned
automobiles, appliances or similar objects." Id.
143. Id. Representative Patrick Dougherty, sponsor of the new Bill, understands
"reasonable distance" to mean "within a few blocks of the nuisance property." Jim
Rygelski, New Law to Battle Nuisance Property, SOUTH CITY J. (St. Louis), Sept. 14,
1994, at IA, 5A.
144. Mo. REV. STAT. § 82.1025 (1994). Because plaintiffs may receive only up to
$1,500 in small claims court, Mo. REv. STAT. § 482.305 (1994), the law "isn't going to
be a money-maker for the people bringing the suit, ... [i]ts purpose is to get people to
clean up their property." Rygelski, supra note 143, at 5A.
According to the law, the "reasonable opportunity" to correct shall not exceed forty-five
days. Mo. REV. STAT. § 82.1025 (1994).
145. Rygelski, supra note 143, at 5A. The law particularly helps to fight absentee
landlords. Id
146. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Snelling, 793 S.W.2d at 232.
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landlord liability, the physical deterioration of property is no longer the
sole reason for which private citizens may wish to sue neighboring
absentee landlords.'48 The Missouri legislature therefore should expand
the meaning of nuisance in this law to include not only the physical
deterioration of a property, but also the continual criminal activity
occurring on the property. A nuisance property, after all, is not simply
a dilapidated building.
Missouri's public nuisance abatement laws include criminal activity
in their definition of nuisance."' The same definition should apply to
laws regulating nuisances in small claims cases. If residents have
sufficient evidence of drug-dealing or criminal street-gang activity
occurring on a neighboring property in their community, the landlord or
property owner who knows or should know of such activity must be held
liable to these neighbors. When neighbors join together against a
particular property owner, their odds of success will significantly
increase.
Furthermore, recovering the diminution in property value is not
always a sufficient remedy.'50 The Lew court allowed such plaintiffs
to recover damages for emotional distress." The small claims courts
of Missouri should grant such damages to concerned Missouri residents
in similar situations who suffer mental injuries due to crime in their
neighborhoods. Allowing tenants and neighbors to collect such damages
will provide an incentive to landlords and other landowners to take
reasonable measures to manage their properties so as to prevent criminal
activity from occurring.'52
B. Amendment to Missouri Nuisance Abatement Statutes
Often neighbors do not want compensation for the diminution of
property value or mental distress.' Rather, many neighbors would
148. See supra part III.
149. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text (discussing nuisance abatement
laws).
150. See, e.g., Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 115-20 (discussing civil RICO and plaintiffs as private attorneys
general).
153. See Freeman & Faris, supra note 136, at 265 n.12. Diminution in value claims
are often undesirable because, among other problems, they involve complex valuation
issues and usually require expert real estate appraisals for each piece of property. Id.
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prefer to have the nuisance building closed down. However, because
public nuisance is an administrative claim, brought on behalf of the
entire community, individual neighbors normally do not act to abate a
public nuisance. 54 When street crime is occurring in a neighborhood,
Missouri residents may not sue under a nuisance abatement statute, even
if a pattern of criminal activity has been occurring in close proximity to
their home.'55  Only the attorney general, circuit attorney, or
prosecuting attorney may prosecute a suit to enjoin the public nuisance
in Missouri.5
6
The criminal activities which constitute a nuisance in Missouri
include prostitution,' selling or manufacturing intoxicating liquor
without a permit,"8 and keeping, manufacturing, or selling controlled
substances.'59 Missouri law also states that any building which is used
by a criminal street-gang in a pattern of criminal activity is a public
nuisance."6 This statute allows for a suit in equity to enjoin the public
nuisance caused by such street-gang activity.16' It also allows for a so-
called "padlock" order, which prohibits access to the property by anyone
for any reason, for a period not to exceed one year. 62
154. Self-help abatements are normally not permissible in the case of public nuisances.
See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of public nuisance. See
also supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the public nuisance tort). Residents
with "special damages" may make such civil claims, but they may not act to abate a
nuisance without legal process. Id.
155. Glesner, supra note 40, at 728-29. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 195.130.2 (1994)
(permitting criminal prosecution, but not civil claims, for public nuisance properties). But
for a discussion of private civil suits for public nuisances, see supra notes 38-39 and
accompanying text.
156. See, e.g.. Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.430.2 (1994) (authorizing attorney general,
circuit attorney, or prosecuting attorney to seek to enjoin public nuisances).
157. Mo. REv. STAT. § 567.080 (1994).
158. Mo. REv. STAT. § 311.740 (1994).
159. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 195.130-195.253 (1994).
160. Mo. REv. STAT. § 578.430 (1994).
161. Mo. REv. STAT. § 578.430.2 (1994). Only prosecutors may bring such suits. Id.
162. Id. The relevant portion states:
If the court finds that the owner of the room, building, structure or inhabitable
structure knew that the premises were being used for criminal street gangs in
a pattern of criminal street gang activity, the court may order that the premises
shall not be occupied or used for such period as the court may determine, not
to exceed one year.
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This statute, by granting a remedy only when a "pattern" of criminal
street-gang activity exists, allows for varying interpretations as to what
constitutes a pattern. 6 The statute is devoid of any guidelines to help
determine what may establish such a pattern of activity.'" Therefore,
the broad language of the Missouri statute may cause problems of proof
for the attorney general, circuit attorney, or prosecuting attorney acting
to abate the nuisance. Fortunately, however, cases throughout the United
States have established that various kinds of evidence may be used to
prove that a property is a public nuisance. 6 ' Such evidence may
include the character of visitors,'" the general reputation of the
place, 67 evidence of noise and fighting, 6' and frequent arrests on the
premises. 69  Of course, the more witnesses who testify that criminal
activity is occurring, the easier it is for public officials to obtain enough
evidence to prove a pattern exists.
Neighbors are more likely to spot and obtain evidence concerning
crime in a given community than are the local city officials. 7° For this
reason, some states have set up administrative systems in which citizens
can alert government officials about a nuisance property in their
neighborhood.' For example, a Texas statute allows the district
Id. Padlock orders are also authorized against drug properties, pursuant to Mo. REV.
STAT. § 195.130.2 (1994), houses of prostitution, id. § 567.080.2, and places where illegal
alcohol is made or sold, id. § 311.750.2.
163. The federal RICO statute, discussed above, also requires a pattern of criminal
activity. Such language has created problems of interpretation since its inception. See
supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (discussing RICO's pattern requirement).
164. Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.430 (1994).
165. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., City of New York ex reL Redlich v. Goldman, 356 N.Y.S.2d 754, 757-
58 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974)(including reputation of visitors as evidence of unlawful activities
on the premises).
167. See, e.g., State ex reL Cox v. Taft, 100 S.E.2d 161, 163-64 (W. Va. 1957)
(allowing evidence regarding the general reputation of the premises to establish defendant's
knowledge of a public nuisance).
168. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tick, Inc., 233 A.2d 866, 867-68 (Pa. 1967)
(allowing evidence of '"loud, boisterous and unseemly noises' in suit to enjoin bar).
169. See, e.g., State exreL. Patterson v. Motorama Motel Corp., 307 N.W.2d 349, 352
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that arrests must be repeated or continuing to establish
proof that prohibited conduct was habitual).
170. MANN & BLAKEMAN, supra note 14, at 2/5.
171. Glesner, supra note 40, at 729.
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attorney to call public meetings in order to identify public nuisances.'72
Once a request for such a meeting is signed by a specified percentage of
the registered voters in an area, the district attorney may authorize a
meeting.'73 The owner of the alleged nuisance property is personally
served with notice prior to the meeting. 74 At the meeting, interested
and concerned neighbors may voice their complaints about an alleged
public nuisance property in front of the owner. 7s After the meeting,
the district attorney may begin proceedings to abate the nuisance if she
determines that sufficient evidence exists. 76
Instead of public meetings, a Florida statute provides for the
creation of local administrative boards. 77  These boards receive
neighbors' complaints and conduct hearings concerning alleged public
nuisances.' The administrative boards have the authority to declare a
property to be a public nuisance, 71 to prohibit further operation of the
172. Id. See also TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 125.042(a) (West Supp.
1995).
173. Id. § 125.042(a)(1). A city attorney or county attorney "having geographical
jurisdiction of the place that is the subject of the voters' complaints" may also authorize
such a meeting. Id. § 125.042(a). The written request for such a meeting must be signed
by at least "(1) 10 percent of the registered voters of the election precinct in which the
public nuisance is alleged to exist or is alleged to be likely to be created; or (2) 20 percent
of the voters of the adjacent election precinct." Id. § 125.042(a)(1),(2).
174. Id. § 125.043(2). General notice of the "purpose, time, and place of the meeting"
may also be posted "at either the county courthouse of the county or the city hall of the
city in which the place that is the subject of the complaints is located" as well as published
"in a newspaper of general circulation published in that county or city . .. ." Id.
§ 125.043(1).
175. Id. § 125.042(a).
176. Id. § 125.044(a). The district attorney, city attorney, or county attorney may
initiate proceedings against owners of nuisances only "on finding ... that a public
nuisance exists or is likely to be created" Id. In such an abatement proceeding:
(1) proof that acts creating a public nuisance are frequently committed at the
place is prima facie evidence that the owner and the operator knowingly
permitted the acts; and
(2) evidence that persons have been convicted of offenses involving acts at the
place that create a public nuisance is admissible to show knowledge on the part
of the owner and the operator that the acts occurred.
Id. § 125.044(b)(1),(2).
177. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.138 (West 1994). The statute is applicable to illegal
drug-related public nuisances and street-gang activities. Id. § 893.138(b)-(d).
178. Id. § 893.138(2).
179. Id. § 893.138(3).
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premises for one year, 8° and/or to seek temporary and permanent
injunctions from the courts.'
Using these Texas and Florida statutes as models, the Missouri
legislature should adopt a similar administrative system. Such a system
would benefit both city officials and the residents in a Missouri
community. It would allow city officials to obtain sufficient evidence to
prosecute and abate nuisances. At the same time, this system would
empower the neighboring residents to act as private attorneys general to
fight crime in their communities. 8 ' Only when public officials work
together with individuals in the affected community may the crime
associated with nuisance properties in Missouri begin to dissipate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent increase in drug dealing activities and criminal street
gangs has created a growing need for the protection of neighborhood
residents. Public officials cannot combat this surge in crime on their
own; community involvement is necessary. The proposed amendments
to Missouri law will allow residents to help fight crime in their
neighborhoods. Such improvements in community organization and
empowerment will prove to be invaluable to the state's efforts to
eliminate drug dealing activities and dismantle criminal street gangs on
a local level.
Suzanne G. Lieberman*
180. Id. § 893.138(3)-(4).
181. Id. § 893.138(6).
182. The term "private attorneys general" was used by Judge Kleinfeld, who dissented
in Oscar and argued for an expansion of the private RICO claim for injured tenants. See
supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. I argue for similar empowerment for tenants
and neighbors to fight crime on a local and state level, rather than on the federal level.
* J.D. 1996, Washington University.
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